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Abstract. Prisoner’s dilemma game is the most commonly used model of spatial
evolutionary game which is considered as a paradigm to portray competition among
selfish individuals. In recent years, Win-Stay-Lose-Learn, a strategy updating rule
base on aspiration, has been proved to be an effective model to promote cooperation
in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game, which leads aspiration to receive lots of attention.
But in many research the assumption that individuals aspiration is fixed is inconsistent
with recent results from psychology. In this paper, according to Expected Value
Theory and Achievement Motivation Theory, we propose a dynamic aspiration model
based on Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rule in which individual’s aspiration is inspired by its
payoff. It is found that dynamic aspiration has a significant impact on the evolution
process, and different initial aspirations lead to different results, which are called Stable
Coexistence under Low Aspiration, Dependent Coexistence under Moderate aspiration
and Defection Explosion under High Aspiration respectively. Furthermore, a deep
analysis is performed on the local structures which cause cooperator’s existence or
defector’s expansion, and the evolution process for different parameters including
strategy and aspiration. As a result, the intrinsic structures leading to defectors’
expansion and cooperators’ survival are achieved for different evolution process, which
provides a penetrating understanding of the evolution. Compared to fixed aspiration
model, dynamic aspiration introduces a more satisfactory explanation on population
evolution laws and can promote deeper comprehension for the principle of prisoners
dilemma.
1. Introduction
The emergence and stability of cooperative behavior among selfish individuals is a
challenging problem in biology, social and economic [1]. The prisoners dilemma game
(PDG) is considered as a paradigm to portray competition among selfish individuals [2–
6]. For general parameter settings, defection is better for selfish individuals to survive
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in population, which is called the tragedy of the commons [7]. However, we can easily
observe numerous cooperation phenomenon in various scenarios. For example, animals
will cooperate to obtain food instead of preying alone; companies will set appropriate
commodity prices instead of maliciously cutting prices; humans will choose to obey the
order instead of jumping in line, etc [8]. Evolutionary game theory provides an practical
framework to explain how the cooperation forms [9–13]. Besides, five representative
mechanisms considered as promoting cooperative have been investigated: kin selection,
direct and indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity and group selection [14].
Since the pioneering work of Nowak and May [15], spatial games were proposed
and have attracted ample attention of researchers, in which players are located on
the spatially structured network and only interact with their neighbors. Since then,
numerous studies have emerged to propose various mechanisms which explained the
emergence and stability of cooperative behavior, such as punishment [16–19], migration
[20–22], game organizers [23, 24], teaching ability [25–27], and so on. In recent years,
aspiration, a value representing individual’s expectation, has attracted many researchers
attention [28–31]. Win-Stay-Lose-Learn is a representative model based on aspiration,
in which one will try to change its strategy only when its payoff is lower than aspiration
[32–34]. Liu and Chen investigated the Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rules in spatial prisoners
dilemma game [32]; Chu and Liu added the voluntary participation into the Win-Stay-
Lose-Learn rules [33]; Fu studied the stochastic Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rules in the spatial
public goods game [34].
These research held the assumption that an individual players aspiration is fixed.
However, according to Expected Value Theory and Achievement Motivation Theory
proposed by Atkinson [35], ones aspiration will be influenced by its previous payoff. If
ones payoff is higher than its aspiration, it tends to be increased, otherwise decreased.
This is consistent with our normal perception because no one can hold a high aspiration
for continued low payoff. In this paper, we thus introduce a dynamic aspiration model
based on Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rules, and the principle of defection’s expansion or
cooperation’s survival under the dynamic aspiration model is investigated. The rest
of our paper is organized as follows. First we show the detailed model for the dynamic
aspiration based on Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rules. Then we give the main results under
our model, which is divided into four parts: Overview, Stable Coexistence under Low
Aspiration, Dependent Coexistence under Moderate aspiration and Defection Explosion
under High Aspiration. Finally we discuss the wider implications of our work and the
direction of the future research.
2. Model
Our model is described as follows. We use the L × L square lattice with periodic
boundary conditions. Each node represents a player who has one of the following two
strategies: cooperation(C), or defection(D). The strategy of node i is represented as
si, and node is aspiration is represented as Ai. At the beginning of the evolutionary
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process, each node is given an initial si and Ai. The evolutionary process is performed
step by step until the network is stable. In each step, players synchronously update
their strategies and aspirations as follows:
(1) Each node i plays the prison’s dilemma game with its four neighbors and gets
the payoff Pi =
∑
j∈Ωi
Pij, where Ωi denotes the neighbors of node i. Pij is got by Table
1, and if both of their strategies are C or D, they will get the reward R or punishment
P . If i’s strategy is C and j’s strategy is D, i will get the suck’s payoff S and the j will
get the temptation value T , vice versa.
Table 1. Payoff matrix of prison’s dilemma game.
C D
C R S
D T P
In prison’s dilemma game, the above parameters meet T>R>P>S. For simplicity,
we set R = 1, T = b, and P = S = 0 in our model. This is a weak version of prisoners
dilemma game for P = S, which is convenient but without losing the accuracy of the
results [15], where 1<b<2 is a parameter that we will explore impact in our experiment.
(2) Each node i chooses one of its four neighbors j randomly with equal probability.
If i’s payoff is lower than its aspiration, i will be dissatisfied and choose to adopt js
strategy with the probability:
Wij =
1
1 + exp[(Pi − Pj)/K] , (1)
where K stands for the amplitude of noise [36]. Without loss of generality, we use
K = 0.1 in our model [37, 38]. If i’s payoff is higher than or equal to its aspiration, i
will be satisfied and not change its strategy.
(3) Each node i updates its aspiration by the formula:
Ai(t + 1) = Ai(t) + a ∗ (Pi(t)− Ai(t)), (2)
where Ai(0) is given initially. All nodes are given the same A(0) and we denote it
as A for convenience. Based on Achievement Motivation Theory, in a representative
model, one’s aspiration is changed concerning its payoff linearly. So we introduce the
dynamic aspiration by the parameter a, where a ∈ [0, 1] stands for the sensitivity of
aspiration. Higher a means individual’s aspiration is easier to be changed by its payoff.
Previous work with fixed aspiration equivalents to the case a = 0, and a = 1 means that
individual’s aspiration totally depends its payoff from the last step. Considering that
one’s aspiration should not be changed too drastically, we set a = 0.01 in our model.
The step will repeat 100,000 times in one simulation. The fraction of cooperators
and defectors at step t are denoted as rCt and rDt respectively. And for each parameter,
we perform 20 independent experiments to get rC, the fraction of cooperators when
stable, which is thought as the main index to measure a network’s cooperation level.
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3. Result
3.1. Overview
Our experiment is performed on the 100×100 square lattice with periodic boundary
conditions. In initial, cooperators and defectors are distributed uniformly at random
occupying half of the square lattice respectively, and all the nodes are given the same
initial aspiration A. As the main parameters, we consider the initial aspiration level A
and the temptation to defect b. Figure 1 presents the fraction rC of cooperators when
stable as a function of the temptation to defect b for different aspiration levels. We find
that the aspiration level has a significant influence on rC. Three different phases, Stable
Coexistence under Low Aspiration, Dependent Coexistence under Moderate aspiration
and Defection Explosion under High Aspiration could be observed for different values
of A. For small values of A (A = 0 and A = 0.8), rC is equal/close to 0.5 no matter
what value b is. For large values of A (A ≥ 2.4), cooperators could hardly survive for
any b>1.0. An interesting phenomenon is discovered for moderate values of A (A = 1.6)
that When b is lower than 1.6, cooperators could not survive and rC almost equals 0,
however when b is higher than 1.6, cooperation could survive and rC is bigger than 0.2.
According to common sense, the higher b is, the harder cooperators survive, which is
inconsistent with our experimental results. Above unusual phenomenon is the focus in
our paper.
Figure 1. Average fractions of cooperation when stable as a function of b for different
values of the initial aspiration A, as obtained by means of simulations on square lattices.
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3.2. Stable Coexistence under Low Aspiration (A ≤ 1.0)
For small values of A, individual’s aspiration is easy to be satisfied so cooperators
and defectors can coexist. For A = 0, all the nodes are satisfied and never change their
strategies, so rC will always keep 0.5. And for A = 0.8, there are only a few nodes whose
four neighbors are all defectors will be dissatisfied: if it is a cooperator, it will change its
strategy to D; if it is a defector, it will be always dissatisfied but can’t change its strategy
since all his neighbors’ strategies are the same. At the beginning, r0 = rD0 = 0.5, so
the frequency of cooperators with four neighbors being all defectors could be calculated
approximately:
r = rC0 ∗ r4D0 =
1
32
≈ 0.03, (3)
which is consistent with the result rC = 0.47 in the simulation experiment and
rC ≈ rC0 − r. In fact, the above result holds for all A ∈ (0, 1], where the proportion
of cooperators dissatisfied is only r4D0 so that cooperators and defectors could coexist.
This case is called Stable Coexistence under Low Aspiration.
3.3. Dependent Coexistence under Moderate aspiration (1.0<A ≤ 2.0)
Figure 2. Snapshots of typical distributions of strategies and aspirations at different
time steps t for A = 1.6 and b = 1.2. (a) represents strategies, where cooperators are
depicted white and defectors are depicted black. (b) represents aspirations. The steps
of them are t=0,10,100,200,500 and 1000 respectively.
For moderate values of A, cooperators can’t survive for small values of b. Figure 2
shows the spatial distributions of strategies and aspirations at different time steps t for
A=1.6 and b=1.2. The evolution process can be divided into the following stages:
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• At first, every node with strictly less than two C neighbors is dissatisfied. Because
the average payoff of defectors is higher than that of cooperators, the number of
defectors increases, and the average aspiration of the network decreases.
• When t = 10, cooperators that still survived have formed some small clusters so
that they can survive and expand in the network, meanwhile dissatisfied defectors
may evolve into cooperators gradually, and the average aspiration of the network
increases.
• When t = 100, cooperators occupy most of the network, however, the average
aspiration of the network is higher than 2.0 and some cooperators connecting to
two defectors are no longer satisfied and change into defectors. At the same time,
cooperators whose neighbors are all cooperators are still satisfied so that they will
not change their strategies and their aspirations will keep rising up.
• When t = 200, the remaining cooperators aspirations are close to 4.0 so that they
are dissatisfied and they also change into defectors gradually, and defectors almost
occupy the entire network and the cooperators almost disappear rapidly.
One can see that although cooperators take advantage in quantity in the process,
defectors finally occupy the network when it is stable. As the aspirations rise up, the
number of cooperators is not enough so that some cooperators are suddenly dissatisfied
and evolve into defectors, which leads to the collapse of cooperation phenomenon. Figure
3 shows the probability that cooperators can survive as a function of the cooperators
initial proportion rC0 for A = 1.6 and b = 1.2. For every different rC0, we perform 100
independent experiments. As we can see, cooperators are possible to survive only when
rC0>0.95, and sure to survive only when rC0>0.99. In other words, defectors can survive
and expand even if they are very few initially, which may be caused by some special
initial structure.
Figure 3. The probability that cooperators can survive as a function of the
cooperators initial proportion rC0 for A = 1.6 and b = 1.2. Cooperators are easier
to survive when rC0 is higher. They are possible to survive only when rC0>0.95, and
sure to survive only when rC0>0.99.
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Figure 4 shows all possible local structures in the network for A = 1.6 and b = 1.2.
When a node has two or less D neighbors, it is always satisfied and wont change its
strategy. When a node has four D neighbors, it is always dissatisfied, but since all its
neighbors are defectors, it can only be a defector.
Figure 4. The local structures of strategies for A = 1.6 and b = 1.2. Each square
corresponds to a single player, where cooperators are depicted blue and defectors are
depicted red. Value denoted in the center square is the individual’s payoff. Smiling
face represents satisfaction while crying face represents dissatisfaction.
Now we consider the structure that a node has three D neighbors and one C
neighbor. Figure 5 shows the detailed principle for defectors expanding under this
initial structure. The evolution process can be divided into the following stages:
• When t = 0, the only one node dissatisfied is node X because its aspiration is 1.0.
Since it has three D neighbors and one C neighbor, X will evolve into cooperator
and defector repeatedly. As a result, node Y s payoff is sometimes 4.8 and sometimes
3.6, and Y s aspiration at step t can be got by the recursive equation:
AY (t) =
{
AY (t− 1) + a ∗ (4.8− AY (t− 1)), sY = D,
AY (t− 1) + a ∗ (3.6− AY (t− 1)), sY = C. (4)
• With t growing, we can easily prove that AY will be higher than 3.6. Next time
when X evolves into a defector, PY = 3.6<AY , so Y is dissatisfied. Y has three C
neighbors, so it will be easy to evolve into a cooperator. But when Y evolves into
cooperator, its payoff will decrease and it is still dissatisfied, so Y will also evolve
into cooperator and defector repeatedly. For the same reason, node Zs payoff is
sometimes 4.0 and sometimes 3.0, and Zs aspiration at step t can be got by the
recursive equation:
AZ(t) =
{
AZ(t− 1) + a ∗ (4.0− AZ(t− 1)), sZ = D,
AZ(t− 1) + a ∗ (3.0− AZ(t− 1)), sZ = C. (5)
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Figure 5. The detailed principle for defectors’ expanding for A = 1.6 and b = 1.2.
A node is surrounded by three defectors and one cooperator initially. Smiling face
represents satisfaction while crying face represents dissatisfaction.
• With t growing, we can easily prove that AZ will be higher than 3.0. Next time
when Y evolves into a defector, PZ = 3.0<AZ , so Z is dissatisfied and may evolve
into a defector in a few steps. Now Zs other neighbors aspirations are all near
to 4.0. Once Z evolves into a defector, their payoffs decrease to 3.0 so they are
dissatisfied and may evolve into defectors, too.
• Furthermore, almost every nodes aspiration in the network is near to 4.0 because
their payoffs have been keeping 4.0 for a long time. As a result, for each node i,
once one of is neighbors evolves into a defector, i may evolve into a defector soon,
which is a chain phenomenon and causes defectors expanding.
Figure 6 shows the spatial distributions of strategies and aspirations at different
time steps t for A = 1.6, b = 1.2 with the above initial structure, from which we can
also get the expansion trajectory by the aspiration distribution.
In the network with random setup, once there is at least one node which has
three D neighbors and one C neighbor, defectors will expand to the whole network. If
rD0 > 0.05, such node almost certainly exists, so defectors almost certainly expand to
the whole network. Cooperators can survive only when there are no above structure in
the network.
However for large values of b, cooperators can partially survive. Figure 7 shows all
possible local structures in the network for A = 1.6 and b = 1.7. Compared to Figure
4, if a cooperator has three D neighbors and one C neighbor, it will be dissatisfied and
may evolve into a defector. But once it evolves into a defector, it becomes satisfied and
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Figure 6. Snapshots of typical distributions of strategies and aspirations at different
time steps t under the initial structure shown in Figure 4 for A = 1.6 and b = 1.2. (a)
represents strategies, where cooperators are depicted white and defectors are depicted
black. (b) represents aspirations. The steps of them are t=0,10,100,200,500 and 1000
respectively.
Figure 7. The local structures of strategies for A = 1.6 and b = 1.7. Each square
corresponds to a single player, where cooperators are depicted blue and defectors are
depicted red. Value denoted in the center square is the individual’s payoff. Smiling
face represents satisfaction while crying face represents dissatisfaction.
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doesn’t change any longer, and the network becomes stable. Figure 8 shows the spatial
distributions of strategies and aspirations at different time steps t for A = 1.6, b = 1.7
with the above initial structure. Cooperators can survive since some of them are always
satisfied.
Figure 8. Snapshots of typical distributions of strategies and aspirations at different
time steps t for A = 1.6 and b = 1.7. (a) represents strategies, where cooperators are
depicted white and defectors are depicted black. (b) represents aspirations. The steps
of them are t=0,10,100,200,500 and 1000 respectively.
From the above we know the main difference between b<1.6 and b ≥ 1.6 for A = 1.6
is whether a defector who has three D neighbors and one C neighbor is satisfied. For
b<1.6, P = b<A, the defector is dissatisfied and will evolve into cooperator and defector
repeatedly, which causes the chain phenomenon leading to defectors expansion shown
in Figure 5. But for b ≥ 1.6, P = b ≥ A, the defector is satisfied and the network will
be stable soon so that cooperators can survive in the end. In fact, for all the A ≤ 2.0,
the conclusion is the same and phase transition happens in b = A because when b = A,
a defector with three D neighbors and one C neighbor has the same value of payoff and
initial aspiration so that it is always satisfied.
3.4. Defection Explosion under High Aspiration (A>2.0)
For A = 2.4, cooperators can survive only when rC0 is high enough for any b>1,
on the contrary, only a few defectors initially can lead cooperators to die out. Figure 9
shows all possible local structures in the network for A = 2.4 and b = 1.7. If a cooperator
has two D neighbors, it is dissatisfied and evolves into a defector soon, and then it is
satisfied. If a cooperator or defector X has three D neighbors, it is dissatisfied and evolve
into cooperator and defector repeatedly. Xs payoff is 1.0 when it is a cooperator and
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Figure 9. The local structures of strategies for A = 2.4 and b = 1.7. Each square
corresponds to a single player, where cooperators are depicted blue and defectors are
depicted red. Value denoted in the center square is the individual’s payoff. Smiling
face represents satisfaction while crying face represents dissatisfaction.
1.7 when it is a defector. Xs aspiration at step t can be got by the recursive equation:
AX(t) =
{
AX(t− 1) + a ∗ (1.7− AX(t− 1)), sY = D,
AX(t− 1) + a ∗ (1.0− AX(t− 1)), sY = C. (6)
With t growing, we can easily prove that AX will be lower than 1.7. And next
time when X evolves into a defector, it will be satisfied and don’t change its strategy
any more. If a cooperator or defector has four D neighbors, it will be never satisfied,
but it can only be a defector since all its neighbors are defectors. All the simple local
structures can’t lead defectors to expand.
Figure 10 shows the structure which causes the defectors expansion. In initial,
nodes X1 and X2 are dissatisfied and may evolve into defectors. Once X1 evolves into a
defector, nodes Y1 and Y2 become dissatisfied and may also evolve into defectors, so do
the other five nodes. All the nine nodes are dissatisfied and evolve into cooperators and
defectors repeatedly. As a result, colored cooperators aspiration will be higher than 3.0
as time goes. Next time when one of the nodes evolves into a defector, the cooperator
will be dissatisfied and evolve into a defector. Since the other nodes aspirations are close
to 4.0, chain phenomenon occurs and defectors will occupy the whole network.
When b is lower, defectors’ expansion requires more strict requirement. When
b = 1.2, for the same structure shown in Figure 10, defectors can’t expand. We find
that before cooperators’ aspiration are higher than 3.0, the nine nodes will be all satisfied
in a step so that the network becomes stable with high probability. The lower b makes
the network stable soon if there are only nine nodes participating in the evolution.
Figure 11 shows the initial structure which causes the defectors expansion, and similar
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Figure 10. The detailed principle for defectors’ expanding for A = 2.4, b = 1.7. The
initial local structure is shown in (a). Smiling face represents satisfaction while crying
face represents dissatisfaction.
to Figure 10, sixteen nodes participate in the evolution. More active nodes make the
evolutionary process lasts longer, so the colored nodes have enough time to increase their
aspirations to higher than 3.0. Figure 12 shows the spatial distributions of strategies
and aspirations at different time steps t for A = 2.4, b = 1.7 with the initial structure
shown in Figure 10. The situation of A = 2.4, b = 1.2 with the initial structure shown
in Figure 11 is almost the same. In fact, the above conclusion is suitable for all the
2.0<A ≤ 3.0. Defectors’ expansion requires more defectors’ gathering when b is lower
or A is higher, vice versa.
Figure 11. The initial structure that causes defectors’ expansion for A = 2.4, b = 1.2.
Smiling face represents satisfaction while crying face represents dissatisfaction.
For A>3.0, the nodes which have at least one D neighbor are dissatisfied, so once
there are at least one defector in the network, defectors will expand to the whole network
soon for any b>1. The higher b is, the faster defectors expansion will be. Figure 13
shows the spatial distributions of strategies and aspirations at different time steps t for
A = 3.2, b = 1.2 with only one defector initially.
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Figure 12. Snapshots of typical distributions of strategies and aspirations at different
time steps t for A = 2.4 and b = 1.7 with the initial structure shown in Figure 10. (a)
represents strategies, where cooperators are depicted white and defectors are depicted
black. (b) represents aspirations. The steps of them are t=0,10,100,200,500 and 1000
respectively.
Figure 13. Snapshots of typical distributions of strategies and aspirations at different
time steps t for A = 3.2 and b = 1.2 with only one defector initially. (a) represents
strategies, where cooperators are depicted white and defectors are depicted black. (b)
represents aspirations. The steps of them are t=0,10,100,200,500 and 1000 respectively.
Zhenyu Shi, Wei Wei, Xiangnan Feng, Xing Li and Zhiming Zheng 14
In dynamic aspiration model, three different phases could be observed. The phase
under low aspiration is similar to the fixed aspiration model because most nodes are
always satisfied and their aspirations are changed in a small range. However, dynamic
aspiration model plays a critical role under moderate aspiration and high aspiration,
where some nodes are dissatisfied no matter they are cooperators or defectors and their
strategies are changed repeatedly. As a result, their neighbors’ payoff are changed and
aspirations will be influenced by the evolution process. Their aspirations become higher
gradually but their payoffs changed repeatedly, which results in their dissatisfaction.
Once a node becomes dissatisfied, chain phenomenon happens and defectors will expand
fast.
4. Conclusion
To conclude, the evolution process of the Win-Stay-Lose-Learn strategy updating
rule on the prisoners dilemma game is studied in this paper. Based on the previous
work, a dynamic aspiration model is proposed, in which players will not only change
their strategies based on aspirations, but also change their aspirations due to their
payoffs.
Three different phases is found. Cooperators and defectors can coexist for small
values of A, which is called Stable Coexistence under Low Aspiration. Only a few
cooperators will evolve into defectors then and the network will be stable immediately,
which is not affected by the value of b. As a comparison, defectors will easily expand
to the whole network for large values of A, which is called Defection Explosion under
High Aspiration respectively. Two kinds of local structures which can lead to defectors’
expansion are found, depending on the values of b. The most interesting phenomenon
is cooperators can survive for higher b(b ≥ A) and die out for lower b(b<A) when
1.0<A ≤ 2.0, which is abnormal because higher b should have meant that it is harder
for the cooperators to survive, and it is called Dependent Coexistence under Moderate
aspiration. The local structure leading the defectors’ expansion is that a cooperator
is surrounded by one cooperator and three defectors. Dynamic aspiration plays an
important role for the above results because a constantly changing individual may make
its neighbors’ aspirations gradually rise up and they will be satisfied no longer at a
future step.
Our work provides a new enlightening opinion for the Win-Stay-Lose-Learn strategy
updating rule. Dynamic aspiration introduces a more satisfactory explanation on
population evolution laws. The reason for emergence and stability of cooperative
behavior under dynamic aspiration model is still a challenging problem. We hope that
our work offers a valuable method that can help explore the principle behind prisoners
dilemma better, especially when combining with other rules which use aspiration level
for personal decision making such as myopic, other-regarding preference or Pavlov-rule
[39–44].
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